

Pros and Cons for Proposed Revisions

For every proposed revision – either a deletion or addition – we are submitting a succinct rationale for proposing the change, and very brief Pro and Con statements. Sources for the Pro and Con statements are noted briefly; in many cases we have more references for these arguments, as well as more arguments. When possible, we have opted to use very current references.

Additions, deletions and substitutions are all denoted by bold print.

GLOSSARY – Abbreviations used here include:

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile
CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPCW – Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

Change 1, an Addition to #1: Toward that end, the U.S. government should give the highest level of importance to arms control efforts that: **Prohibit nuclear weapons testing**;

Rationale: In fact, this issue is one on which LWVUS has lobbied strenuously in the past; it is once again a pending issue, and one on which we urge continuing action; therefore we urge its elevation to the category of highest importance.

Pro: A test ban would not hurt the U.S. because it does not test nuclear weapons, and advances in simulated testing are sufficient to meet its needs to maintain the reliability of its stockpile, and even replace parts of it. Moreover, a test ban would make it more difficult for other nations to develop new weapons or increase the lethality of existing ones. Finally, a test ban is seen as a step which can reassure a doubting world that the U.S. is serious about meeting its disarmament obligations under the NPT.¹

Con: The complex and disparate array of threats facing the U.S. call for the development of a new array of nuclear weapons appropriate to them; and this requires keeping the option of explosive testing available. The program of simulated testing may be adequate for maintaining the reliability of the nuclear arsenal, but not its effectiveness.

¹ Kingston Reif, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Modernization of the nuclear force must be given first priority – then disarmament measures can be considered.²

Change 2, a Deletion to #3: **As a long term goal**, the League supports the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons.

Rationale: This clause is being deleted because, while it will take a long time to achieve, the elimination of nuclear weapons is now the expressed goal of the U.S. – as it was not in when the Arms Control Position was written in 1983.

Pro: President Obama made this an explicit goal of the U.S. in his April 5, 2009 speech in Prague. Then, on September 24, 2009 the UN Security Council committed to work for a world free of nuclear weapons by voting unanimously for UNSC Resolution 1887, offered by the U.S. during a session chaired by President Obama.³ This culminates a long history of support for the elimination of nuclear weapons since 1983.⁴

Con: Since 1945 there has not been a world war, in part because of the deterrent force its nuclear arsenal offers the U.S. and its allies; the modernization of that force is imperative, and must precede any disarmament goals.⁵

Change 3, an Addition to #4: The League of Women Voters recognizes that peace in an interdependent world is a product of cooperation among nations and therefore strongly favors multilateral negotiations. **Leadership by the United States in advancing arms control measures through negotiations and periodic review is encouraged.**

Rationale: The intent is to encourage U.S. leadership in arms control at this time because, as other nations are growing in economic and thus political power, it is important to global security to pursue arms control and disarmament as a strategy to discourage a new arms race from arising.

Pro: With regard to weapons of mass destruction, the principal challenges are to make existing arms stockpiles safe, stem proliferation and advance disarmament.⁶ No nation can meet these challenges alone, but they cannot be met without America – working to foster cooperation in a multi-partner world.⁷ As the sole military superpower, the U.S. has a particular responsibility to lead in the creation and maintenance of a strong arms control regime – by participating in arms control negotiations and reviews, and by taking steps at home to lead by example.⁸

² Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation

³ America.gov – 9/24/09

⁴ Ann Lakhdhir, Arms Control Task Force background paper, LWVUS website

⁵ Senator Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, editorial 6/30/09

⁶ Hans Blix et al.

⁷ Secretary Clinton, speech 7/15/09

⁸ Fmr. Senator Jim Talent, NewsHour, 1/26 /10

Con: Fostering cooperation in a multi-partner world is a policy which threatens to undermine American sovereignty. National autonomy, constitutional self-governance, and defense are all imperiled by bi- and multilateral arms control negotiations and reviews.⁹

Change 4, an Editorial Revision to #4: This is a very long paragraph, which we suggest breaking into two paragraphs at this point; with the first one being more general, and the second referencing specific types of weapons (e.g. nuclear).

In what follows, the numbering of the paragraphs in which revisions occur is changed to reflect this adjustment.

Change 5, an Addition to #5: Given the potential for worldwide proliferation of nuclear technology, efforts involving all countries are essential to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to protect commonly held nuclear-weapons free regions such as the seabed, **polar regions**, and outer space.

Rationale: This change just extends a provision of the original position, to cover the polar regions – one of which is a nuclear weapons-free zone and one of which is not.

Pro: The Antarctic region has been a nuclear weapons-free zone since the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, and this should continue. Increasingly there is a call for a similar provision for the Arctic region – as melting has made previously inaccessible regions accessible. Oil resources, a more navigable Northwest Passage, and newly created borders where land replaces ice, are creating tensions; even the notion that the whole area is commonly held is being challenged in order to stake claims to oil. It is important that the polar regions be recognized as commonly held, and that other regional tensions not be heightened by nuclear weapons on the scene.¹⁰

Con: During the Cold War this area was part of the U.S. – Soviet standoff; although the U.S. will neither confirm nor deny its activity, this continues albeit with less intensity: nuclear submarines from both sides are believed to patrol the area, and both have nuclear capable aircraft which can over-fly the Arctic.¹¹ A Bush Presidential Directive affirms the U.S. has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region, and directs the government to preserve the mobility of all U.S. civilian and military vessels in the region – which surely implies opposition to the creation of an Arctic nuclear weapons-free zone.¹²

Change 6, an Addition to #5: Multilateral efforts are appropriate as well to achieve bans on the possession of chemical, biological and radiological weapons; **and to achieve limitations on the transfer or trade of all weapons.**

⁹ Fmr. UN Amb. John Bolton, American Enterprise Institute, 1/7/10

¹⁰ Ed Struzik, Great Decisions 2009

¹¹ Canadian Pugwash Call for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, 8/24/07

¹² President George W. Bush, Arctic Region Policy, 1/9/09

Rationale: The intent is to direct attention to a worsening problem: the transfer and trade of weapons to states and non-state actors. The reference here to “all weapons” is deliberate: concern about the spread of WMD is a staple of arms control, but increasing attention is now being directed to the trade of conventional weapons; since the League may someday want to advocate on this, it seems useful to write this position broadly.

Pro: Re WMD: The global proliferation of nuclear and biological materials and technologies, coupled with the active efforts by non-state organizations with global reach and sophistication, make a terrorist attack with WMD highly likely somewhere in the world in the next four years. Prohibiting the trade or transfer of these materials and technologies is a response to this threat which could be useful in minimizing this eventuality.¹³

Con: Re WMD: No contemporary argument against controlling the transfer and trade of WMD has been located – put another way, no one wants a free market for anthrax!

Pro: Re conventional weapons: In October 2009 the U.S. committed to working at the UN towards an international Arms Trade Treaty, establishing legally binding standards for the import, export, and transfer of conventional arms.¹⁴ Civil society groups have a role to play in making the moral argument to move this new agenda forward. Basically, that argument is that the current patchwork of laws has gaps which allow the uncontrolled trade and transfer of weapons to flourish, with the result that hundreds of people are killed daily; a global law can fill those gaps, and contribute to ending this tragedy.¹⁵

Con: Re conventional weapons: The proposed Treaty is unneeded or unwise because: it is not arms trade which causes wars, but enmity and tension; the trade or transfer of weapons to terrorists is already illegal, the laws just need to be enforced; and embargoes on given countries or areas are a more precise means than are restrictions on businesses to prevent trade with countries we do not want to have small arms.¹⁶ Moreover, the Obama administration’s support for an Arms Trade Treaty applicable to conventional weapons is just a back-door way to pursue a domestic gun control agenda.¹⁷

Change 7, a Deletion to # 6: The League of Women Voters believes, **however, that for arms control to be effective, bilateral efforts are also necessary. Bilateral efforts may be especially appropriate in negotiations to limit and reduce quantities of weapons.**

Rationale: The full meaning of this passage is retained in the Addition which supplants it; the reason for making the change is to mute the Cold War resonances by saying

¹³ Bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD and Terrorism, update/report card 1/26/10

¹⁴ Secretary Clinton, remarks, 10/14/09

¹⁵ Bernard Kouchner, French Minister of Foreign Affairs and David Milliband, British Secretary of State, editorial, 11/11/09

¹⁶ Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation, #2309, 1/2/09

¹⁷ Fmr. UN. Amb. John Bolton, American Enterprise Institute, 1/7/10

‘bilateral’ less often, and adding some post-Cold War terms. Pros and cons are not necessary here, as the deletion is purely editorial.

Change 8, an Addition to #6: The League of Women Voters believes **effective arms control may necessitate** bilateral negotiations to limit, **safeguard** and reduce **weapons stockpiles**.

Rationale: In 1983, this reference to bilateral negotiations implied agreements between the U.S. and the USSR, aimed at controlling the arms race and nuclear standoff between them; here the intent is to recognize the residual matters the U.S. and Russia must resolve, for which the terms ‘safeguard’ and ‘stockpiles’ have gained currency. But, while the U.S. – Russia nuclear case is the most obvious one calling for bilateral negotiation, nothing in the language of the position is meant to preclude application to other cases (different countries, different weapons) should they emerge.

Pro: The U.S. and Russia have 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons, so nuclear disarmament must begin with reductions in their stockpiles. Such an effort is important for two purposes: to reach the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons in the interest of global security; and to persuade the world that the nuclear weapons states are serious about their obligation under the NPT to disarm – thereby removing an incentive some states feel to acquire nuclear weapons.¹⁸ Negotiations on the bilateral START follow-on treaty are underway; the administration hopes to conclude them before the NPT review conference in May 2010.

Con: The U.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons infrastructure need modernization so urgently, Congress has required that a plan for modernization be submitted when a new U.S. – Russia START agreement is submitted for ratification; in fact, that’s not enough: the Congress should not ratify a new START agreement until sufficient progress has actually been made on modernization.¹⁹

Change 9, a Substitution to #9 – Equity: In this revision **each nation’s** is deleted and **all nations’** is substituted. The sentence: The terms should be mutually beneficial, and **each nation’s/all nations’** security and interests should be adequately protected.

Rationale: In the context of the sentence, “each nation’s” denotes each party to the treaty; “all nations” is intended to denote signatories and non-signatories; the intention is to reflect the desirability, in this time of geopolitical flux, that all nations feel their basic security needs are being met.

Pro: Support for this change can be built on the basis of LWV history and belief, without external buttressing. It is a League Principle that “cooperation with other nations is essential in the search for solutions to world problems,” and throughout its 90 year history, the League has steadily expanded its view of who is in this circle of cooperation.

¹⁸ Fmr. Secretaries Shultz, Perry and Kissinger, and Fmr. Senator Nunn, editorial, 1/4/07; also, Nuclear Strategic Posture report, 2009; also, Carlos Pascual and Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution, 1/21/10

¹⁹ Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation, #2715 12/3/09

This is clear in the evolving history of LWVUS positions and advocacy on the UN, international trade, and developing countries. Now, with the rise of some developing nations to economic and political power, and with the leap to acquire nuclear weapons as evidence of their power by other nations, it is especially important to encourage the United States to be responsive to what all nations say they require for their security as arms control agreements are drafted and adopted.²⁰

Con: Deference to the demands of other countries is often inimitable to the security interests of the United States. This orientation often overlooks the danger other nations pose to us – a danger experience shows is best kept at bay by the maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent. The thesis of a post-American world in which the rise of other nations to economic power diminishes the superpower status of the United States is at odds with another worldview – American exceptionalism – which insists that prosperity elsewhere need not diminish the moral or military status of the United States, and that America need not melt into any global whole.²¹

Change 10, an Addition to #9 - Equity: The following new sentence is added at the end of the paragraph: **Efforts should be made to reduce the status of being a nuclear weapons state, as a ‘have and have not’ distinction between nations is inherently inequitable.**

Rationale: This change recognizes a problem which has been mounting as time passes, and which threatens the whole nuclear non-proliferation regime: inequity. One glaring inequity is that under the NPT there are five legitimate nuclear weapons states – which happen also to be the five permanent members of the Security Council, creating the perception that great powers have nuclear weapons; another inequity is that the requirement on the nuclear weapons states to disarm is voluntary, while the requirement on the non-nuclear weapons states to submit to inspections is obligatory.

Pro: As he left the helm of the International Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei said inequity threatens the viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: “Any regime...has to have a sense of fairness and equity and it is not there.” Consequently, proliferation is rampant; the current up-tick in proliferation includes states which have built or are presumably building nuclear weapons, and states which are building their capacity to do so, stopping at “virtual nuclear weapons.” The only way back from this abyss is for the established nuclear powers to begin keeping their side of the NPT bargain (disarm) – so that the non-nuclear states will keep their side (forgo nuclear weapons). A persuasive movement towards disarmament would entail reductions in stockpiles, a test ban, and a halt to the production of weapons-grade fissile material.²²

Con: Peace has been, and must be, achieved through strength. There is no reason to think reductions in our nuclear arsenal would dissuade others, such as Iran, from developing nuclear weapons – but it would leave us less able to defend ourselves and our allies

²⁰ League of Women Voters Impact on Issues, International Relations section

²¹ Fmr. UN Amb. John Bolton; American Enterprise Institute, 1/7/10

²² Interview with Mohamed ElBaradei, in The Guardian, 5/14/09

against a nuclear armed Iran. Moreover, the United States provides a nuclear umbrella of protection to 31 countries; some of them might feel unprotected if the U.S. further cuts its arsenal – and turn to developing nuclear weapons of their own. A robust U.S. nuclear force discourages proliferation by everyone.²³

Change 11, an Addition to #10 – Verifiability: Each party should be able to ensure that other parties comply with the terms of the agreement, whether using national **or international** technical means (**such as:** satellites, seismic sensors, or electronic monitors) or on-site inspection.

Rationale: The addition of this phrase recognizes reality: international monitoring bodies and technologies are part of the verification regime in place for nuclear and chemical weapons, and are being actively sought for biological weapons and the trade of conventional weapons.

Pro and Con: There is not the usual pro-con division over whether parties should use international methods to verify compliance with the terms of the agreement; that is the norm. The IAEA and OPCW are international technical organizations with responsibility for assuring compliance to agreements covering nuclear and chemical weapons respectively; and the Security Council is the international political body charged with responding to threats to peace and security throughout the world.

Serious arms control analysts on both sides of the usual ideological divide accept the role of multilateral or international institutions – the differences usually arise in assessing the past or potential effectiveness of specific actions by specific organizations. For instance, they differ over the adequacy of verification measures relevant to the CTBT. But interestingly, they sometimes concur; that is strikingly so in the case of Iran, where both sides criticize the international verification apparatus: for failing to know what Iran was doing, or failing to refer it to the Security Council for action, or failing to inspect quickly (e.g., at Qom), and so on.²⁴

Change 12, an Addition to #12 – Confidence-Building: Fostering confidence is vital in efforts to **stem the development and proliferation of weapons and** prohibit **their** first use; and to reduce tensions.

Rationale: The intent of this change is to make the position more relevant; prohibiting first use was a major concern during the Cold War, and should not be deleted now; but the development and proliferation of weapons is of rising concern and so is being added. This paragraph has Cold War resonances which suggest it is about nuclear weapons, but neither the original nor the revisions specifies that; nothing about the revision or the following discussion is meant to preclude the application of this position to the whole spectrum of weapons.

²³ Sen. Jon Kyl, press release, 5/11/09; also, Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, editorial, 6/30/09

²⁴ David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, Arms Control Association article, 12/2009; Fmr. Amb. Jackie Wolcott, Heritage Foundation lecture, 2/25/09

Pro: Virtually everyone agrees that the post-Cold War era has seen the rise of unstable states and non-state organizations intent on terror which is contributing to a real and potential rise in the proliferation of weapons. Pro and Con differences arise over how to stem this proliferation; while not mutually exclusive, there are two distinct preferences. One side emphasizes building multilateral institutions and a non-proliferation regime of laws as the most effective way of stemming proliferation.²⁵ And for this, confidence-building measures which assure the parties of the military and political intentions of one another, is a time-tested way of reaching a negotiated agreement.²⁶

Con: While this side favors confidence-building measures when non-proliferation agreements are struck, its prescription for stemming proliferation de-emphasizes the international non-proliferation regime, instead relying on an enormously capable military and a doctrine of pre-emptive strikes.²⁷ Iraq is Exhibit A, illustrating these contrasting preferences. Both sides were pressing their views in the lead-up to the war; inspections were underway and so was military pre-positioning. Ultimately, the choice had to be made between continuing inspections or moving when weather conditions were optimal – and President Bush exercised his preference for the military option.

Change 13, an Addition to #13 – Widespread Agreement: The following sentence is added at the end of the paragraph: **The United States should keep lines of communication open.**

Rationale: The intention is to make the policy relevant to the current circumstances in which whether or not to talk with adversarial states (and non-state actors) has become a matter of debate; the revision evolves from the LWV Principle that “cooperation with other nations is essential in the search for solutions to world problems.”

Pro: During the Cold War, open lines of communication became standard operating procedure between the U.S. and USSR; summits were important to achieving arms control agreements and the hotline between Washington and Moscow was an important confidence-building measure which made accidents and miscalculations less likely; moreover, the two states always had embassies which allowed for communication on many matters to be routine. Much current debate on this issue focuses on Iran – with whom no such open lines of communication exist. The argument that they should exist begins with Yitzak Rabin’s comment: “You don’t make peace with friends, you make peace with very unsavory enemies.” In the 2008 election debate over whether or not to make talking directly with Iran about its nuclear program a priority, a rationale for doing so was that talks might succeed, but if they fail that might persuade Russia and China to join the U.S. in advocating for vigorous sanctions.²⁸

²⁵ Fmr. Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr., 2004, p.149.

²⁶ Michelle Maiese, Beyond Intractability article, 9/2003

²⁷ Fmr. Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr., *ibid.*

²⁸ Fmr. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, Newsweek article, 10/25/08

Con: A rationale for not talking with Iran includes the view that this has been tried and has failed – and the time spent trying and failing has given Iran more time to develop its nuclear capabilities. It also includes the view the proponents of dialog are naïve in thinking Tehran will negotiate in good faith, which it has not done in six years of talks with the EU (as surrogate for the U.S.)²⁹ Sanctions, regime change, and a military strike by Israel have their advocates, as options to dialog.

Change 14, a Deletion to #14 – Environmental Protection: Environmental protection **has special significance in negotiations to prohibit the possession of biological, chemical and radiological weapons and to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.**

Rationale: Because the meaning of the deleted sentence is retained and expanded by the substitute sentence, we do not think it requires Pros and Cons.

Change 15, an Addition to #14 – Environmental Protection: Environmental protection has special significance in negotiations **regarding all weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons that have residual effects.**

Rationale: As noted, the revision of the first sentence retains and expands the meaning of the original. The succinct term “all weapons of mass destruction” is substituted for the detailed list in the original, and the specific references to types of negotiations (i.e., to prohibit the possession of some weapons, to limit the proliferation of others) are deleted as these limit League’s ability to respond to other types of negotiations (e.g., to limit first use, or reduce stockpiles) which might arise for these types of weapons. The phrase “conventional weapons that have residual effects” is added to expand the list by recognizing the more recent proliferation of conventional weapons such as depleted uranium, unexploded cluster bombs, and land mines which pose environmental hazards and so suggest a need for environmental protections.

Pro: The fall-out from Chernobyl was carried by the winds far and wide, illustrating the simple truth that all the nations and peoples on planet earth inhabit one environment. U.S. arms control negotiators should be sensitive to this – a global interest in a safe environment is implicated in their work.

Con: U.S. arms control negotiators should be sensitive to one thing: U.S. national security – and the security of those nations it protects. The environmental agenda has nothing to do with the arms control agenda.

Change 16, an Addition to #17: The League supports efforts to achieve quantitative limits or reductions that focus on nuclear warheads, **non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction**, missiles and other delivery systems, antiballistic missiles, conventional weapons or troop levels.

²⁹ Fmr. UN Amb. John Bolton, Washington Post editorial, 7/2/09

Rationale: This is a simple editorial change, including “non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction” (e.g., biological weapons) in what is otherwise a quite comprehensive list of armaments. This inclusion is consistent with many other provisions in this position, so we do not feel Pro and Con arguments are needed.

Change 17, an Addition to #17: **To assure consideration of technical, cost, and geopolitical benefits, any further development, deployments, or expansions of these should be accompanied by rigorous analyses that examine their impact and benefit on national security.**

Rationale: This revision provides a statement that requests that proposed expenditures for systems like ABM systems or development of new or advanced nuclear weapons should be justified with an appropriate threat analysis that is realistic and demonstrates the cost benefit of the proposal. Inexplicably this is not always the case in major weapons developments that more frequently are based on political reasons and may not account for the perceptions of other negotiating partners.

Pro: This modification to the existing position allows for the League to advocate for a rational justification for U.S. actions in the context of technical capabilities not available when the original position was developed. Supporting this addition gives the League specific new grounds for challenging new U.S. actions, such as the deployment of ABM systems, which are not based on rigorous, rational evaluation – but that have been bartered for international political reasons.

Con: While technical and cost analyses are important, national security must be given primacy. New dangers – due to actual or potential proliferation of WMD to rogue states and non-state actors – must be met irregardless of cost.

Change 18, a Deletion to #18: **The League advocates limits on the spread or proliferation of weapons to inhibit transfers of nuclear technology or weapons from one nation to another or to a geographic region such as the seabed or outer space.**

Rationale: The full meaning of this sentence is retained in the expanded version offered as an addition; therefore we do not feel Pro and Con arguments are needed.

Change 19, an Addition to #18: **The League opposes the spread, proliferation and transfer of weapons and non-peaceful nuclear technology and fissile materials between nations or to non-state actors or to commonly held areas such as the seabed, outer space, or polar regions. The League supports establishing effective international monitoring, accounting and control of such transfers.**

Rationale: While continuing its opposition to the spread or proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and material, the revision also specifies opposition to the transfer of these items – recognizing a contemporary concern. This is emphasized by the addition of non-state actors to the list of entities to which such transfers might be made. The addition of the second sentence recognizes that some legal transfers will occur, and that

the League supports an enhanced role for international bodies in developing means to oversee these transfers, so that they may not be exploited by belligerent states or non-state actors.

Pro: This position reaffirms the League's concern about the dissemination of dangerous technology and materials into the hands of those who may not have peaceful motives, and it offers support for establishing means to control that dissemination. It offers the League grounds for advocating for international means of monitoring and controlling the handling of the much larger quantities of materials and weapons and exploitable technology that exist now than in 1983.

Con: Opponents will argue against relying on international bodies for national security.

Change 20, an Addition to #20: Other League-supported measures to reduce tensions and create a climate of trust among nations include scientific and cultural exchanges, conflict resolution training and strengthening the United Nations **and its supporting agencies. Efforts are encouraged to mediate regional issues and arrive at negotiated settlements to minimize arms build-ups and avoid conflicts.**

Rationale: The first addition acknowledges that in reducing tensions and creating trust around the world, it is often not the deliberations of the General Assembly or Security Council, but the practical activities of the UN's supporting agencies that are most effective. The intention of the second addition is to recognize the importance of interventions aimed at preventing armed conflict.

Pro: Direct and indirect wars between the great powers have abated; the hallmark of this period is a relentless stream of civil wars, insurgencies, and regional conflicts. They often occur in impoverished countries, often involve ethnic cleansing, often create refugee crises, and often require outside intervention in the aftermath. These conflicts also often have ramifications across the globe as they incubate terrorism, weapons proliferation, and other ills.³⁰ Authors on this side of the debate claim national and global security are now inextricably linked; creating an imperative for nations to tackle problems cooperatively and to mediate disputes before they flare into conflict.³¹

Con: The authors just cited believe sovereignty is a concept which needs redefinition in terms of global interests and responsibility. On the other side are authors who reassert an old fashioned national sovereignty which argues for intervening in situations which affect U.S. security interests, economic interests, or ideological interests – namely, the defense of liberty.³² This side has so neglected the State Department and other agencies which can mediate disputes, that much of the work of peacemaking and nation-building they have felt constrained to do has been undertaken by the military.³³

³⁰ Susan Rice, Brookings Institution paper, 12/19/06

³¹ Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen Stedman, Brookings Institution authors, 2008 and 3/16/09

³² Barbara Conry, CATO Policy Analysis 209, 5/19/94; also Heritage Foundation Fact Sheet 43, cited in Memo #2803, 2/12/10

³³ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Brookings Institution speech, 5/5/08

Change 21, an Addition of #22: Efforts to strengthen the arms control regime of international laws, oversight bodies, and verification modalities are also supported, and U.S. engagement and leadership in this regard is encouraged. The League supports diligence by the United States in meeting the terms of arms control agreements and in reviewing their effectiveness over time.

Rationale: This additional paragraph recognizes the need for growing international collaboration and multinational agreements. It encourages the U.S. to take the leadership in developing these protocols and agreements that constitute the arms control regime. The statement recognizes that conditions evolve among all nations and relevant parties and that it is necessary to review and maintain agreements for relevance, usefulness and applicability.

Pro: This additional paragraph emphasizes the need for leadership as the treaties are being negotiated and as the non-proliferation treaty is being reviewed. The statement supplies additional motivation for ratifying the CTBT. As conditions evolve the agencies of the UN such as the IAEA will be needed to play an expanded role, as will the CTBT Organization, which is charged with monitoring compliance to that treaty.

Con: Opponents of this paragraph will express concern about the unreliability of verification technology and a distrust for international agreements and organizations.

Change 22, an Addition of #23: All the provisions of this position regarding possession, proliferation, transfer or trade, use of first use, and testing which apply to states should also be regarded as applying to non-state actors.

Rationale: The intention is to make this position relevant to one of the biggest geopolitical changes since the original position was written: the rise of non-state actors who have perpetrated acts of terror globally, and who seek WMD. This revision simply extends the main provisions of the position, written originally with states in mind, to also apply to this new player on the global stage: non-state actors.

Pro and Con : In all elections since 2000, the Republican and Democratic candidates for president have agreed that “the greatest danger facing the U.S. is nuclear weapons – especially in the hands of terrorists.”³⁴ Subsequent to the attack on the United States by al Qaeda on 9/11, there have been many partisan debates as to how to respond. But there has been a somber concurrence that there is an extremist threat; that the consequences would be worse if WMD were used in an act of terror; and that measures must be taken to keep weapons, and especially weapons of mass destruction, out of the hands of the transnational networks posing this threat.

One small but symbolic point of difference, Pro and Con, is semantic. What do we call the adversary? Extremists? Terrorists? In this position we have deliberately used the

³⁴ Presidential debates 2000, 2004, 2008

sterile, technical term non-state actors. But the other language is useful; we are referring, of course, to organizations whose views are extremist and which ask some of their members to be terrorists.

Pro: Many previous Pro and Con arguments apply here, particularly the distinction between those who want to meet the threats we face with arms control measures, and those who want to meet them militarily. Arms control advocates argue that all the measures directed at states which will reduce stockpiles, stem proliferation, curb transfers and trade, prohibit first use, end production, etc., of weapons of mass destruction will make it more unlikely terrorists (or rogue states) will acquire WMD. The more effective arms control is, the safer the world is.³⁵ Other actions by states are also important in keeping non-state actors from using WMD, including: preventing these organizations from using their territory as a base of action; strengthening their safeguards over stockpiles of weapons and constituent materials; and strengthening intelligence operations.³⁶

Con: Nuclear terrorism and proliferation to Iran and North Korea are dangers which must be addressed – but not through U.S. – Russian arms control, or a test ban treaty; neither will protect the U.S. or its allies from these dangers. Nuclear weapons can help deter war; our strength will protect us and our allies. Modernizing these forces is where our focus ought to be.³⁷ Because rogue states cheat on arms control agreements, and terrorists are not bound by them they really fail to protect us; by contrast, the multiple strategies of the war on terror do. These include intense homeland security, tightened border and airport security, integrated intelligence gathering, financial measures, surveillance measures, capture and retention of terrorists, and military interventions including pre-emptive war, counter-terrorism strategies, counter-insurgency strategies, and stealthy Drone attacks. The more effective the war on terror, the safer the world is.

³⁵ Fmr. Amb. Thomas Graham, *ibid.*, p. 17

³⁶ Hans Blix, et al., 2006, p. 28

³⁷ Senator Jon Kyl, press releases, 5/7/09 and 5/11/09

